Arguments that take counterconsiderations into account by van Laar, Jan Albert
  
 University of Groningen
Arguments that take counterconsiderations into account





IMPORTANT NOTE: You are advised to consult the publisher's version (publisher's PDF) if you wish to cite from
it. Please check the document version below.
Document Version
Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
Publication date:
2014
Link to publication in University of Groningen/UMCG research database
Citation for published version (APA):
van Laar, J. A. (2014). Arguments that take counterconsiderations into account. Informal logic, 43(3), 240-
275. https://doi.org/10.22329/il.v34i3.4055
Copyright
Other than for strictly personal use, it is not permitted to download or to forward/distribute the text or part of it without the consent of the
author(s) and/or copyright holder(s), unless the work is under an open content license (like Creative Commons).
Take-down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately
and investigate your claim.
Downloaded from the University of Groningen/UMCG research database (Pure): http://www.rug.nl/research/portal. For technical reasons the
number of authors shown on this cover page is limited to 10 maximum.
Download date: 12-11-2019






Arguments that take Counter- 
considerations into Account 
 
 
JAN ALBERT VAN LAAR 
 
University of Groningen 
Faculty of Philosophy 
Oude Boteringestraat 52 





Abstract: This paper examines 
arguments that take counter- 
considerations into account, and it 
does so from a dialogical point of 
view.  According to my account, a 
counterconsideration is part of a 
critical reaction from a real or 
imagined opponent, and an arguer 
may take it into account in his 
argument in at least six fully 
responsive ways. Conductive 
arguments (or: pro and con 
arguments, balance of con-
siderations arguments) will be 
characterized as one of these types. 
In this manner, the paper aims to 
show how conducive, and related 
kinds of argument can be understood 
dialogically. 
Résumé: On examine d’un point de 
vue dialogique les arguments qui 
tiennent compte de l’appui des 
objections d’un adversaire réel ou 
imaginaire. Un raisonneur peut en 
tenir compte de six façons, une 
desquelles sont les arguments 
conducteurs (ou : les arguments 
fondés sur le pour et contre, les 
arguments qui pèsent le fondement 
des positions opposées). De cette 
manière, on tente de montrer 
comment ce type d’argument et ceux 
qui y sont reliés peuvent être 








The notion of a conductive argument has been introduced by 
Carl Wellman in his book Challenge and Response: 
Justification in Ethics (1971). In Wellman’s view, the notions of 
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induction and deduction do not deal adequately with the 
characteristics of ethical argumentation, and the notion of 
conduction is needed to explain how ethical statements can be 
justified. After having been discussed in detail by, among 
others, Govier (1979) and Hitchcock (1980), the idea of a 
conductive argument has recently given rise to a number of 
discussions in the philosophy of argument (Johnson and Blair, 
2011; Adler, 2013; Hitchcock, 2013), many of which involve 
the concept of a "counterconsideration." Also recently, 
counterconsiderations have been put forward as being of 
primary importance within the dialogical theory of criticism, as 
developed by Krabbe and van Laar (Krabbe and van Laar 2011; 
van Laar and Krabbe 2013). In this paper, I will discuss 
counterconsiderations as they have been studied within the 
literature on conduction taking the latter, dialogical perspective. 
By dealing with counterconsiderations in this way, I follow a 
suggestion from Blair (2011, p. 6).1 
According to Wellman, “[c]onduction can best be defined as that 
sort of reasoning in which 1) a conclusion about some individual 
case 2) is drawn non-conclusively 3) from one or more premises 
about the same case 4) without appeal to other cases” (Wellman, 
1971, p. 52). He identifies three patterns of conduction. In 
pattern 1, “a single reason is given for the conclusion” 
(Wellman, 1971, p. 55). For example: “You ought to help him 
for he has been very kind to you” (Wellman, 1971, p. 55). In 
pattern 2, “several considerations, each of which may be 
independently relevant, are brought together into a unified 
argument from which a single conclusion is drawn” (Wellman, 
1971, p. 56). For example: “You ought to take your son to the 
movie because you promised to do so, it is a good movie, and 
you have nothing better to do this afternoon” (Wellman, 1971, 
p. 56). A pattern 3 conductive argument is “that form of 
argument in which some conclusion is drawn from both positive 
and negative considerations … reasons against the conclusion 
are included as well as reasons for it” (Wellman, 1971, p. 57). 
For example: “Although your lawn needs cutting, you ought to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 This paper is influenced by Rescher’s book Dialectics (1977), yet my 
conceptual framework differs in subtle ways from his. Therefore, I will 
compare some terms that I employ with those by Rescher, largely in the 
footnotes. 
2 Although I am not going to provide an interpretation of Wellman, I do think 
that a dialogical interpretation of the role of counterconsiderations fits his 
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take your son to the movies because the picture is ideal for 
children and will be gone by tomorrow” (Wellman, 1971, p. 57). 
In this paper, the emphasis lies on examples that fit the patterns 
2 and 3, and, rather than dealing with the proper interpretation 
of Wellman,2 I will deal with a number of simple examples, 
advanced as typically conductive by Wellman or Govier,3 and 
conceive of them as argumentative structures generated in 
dialogue.4  
Specifically, I will examine how conductive arguments 
can be generated in dialogical exchanges between an arguing 
proponent and an opponent who criticizes the proponent’s case 
actively, i.e., by advancing counterconsiderations, rather than by 
mere questioning.5 What is more, I will develop a general 
account of the ways counterconsiderations can be taken into 
account by a proponent, so as to show that conductive argument 
can be characterized as just one particular member of a family of 
closely related argumentative structures. In previous papers on 
the dialogical theory of criticism, it has been examined how 
criticism can be characterized in a more or less systematic 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Although I am not going to provide an interpretation of Wellman, I do think 
that a dialogical interpretation of the role of counterconsiderations fits his 
dialogical inclinations, as they emerge in at least three places in his 1971 
book. (a) Wellman locates reasoning, “in those conversations in which one 
person is trying to defend some statement against the attacks of other people” 
(1971, p. 86). (b) In his view, the justification of a statement consists in 
meeting the challenges actually made to it: "One obvious objection to my 
view (...) is that (...) to justify fully one must meet all possible challenges. I 
argue that this is not so and that the data of ethical justification are simply 
any premises, arguments, or moves that are in fact accepted" (p. xii). (c) 
Also, he conceives of “valid” and “invalid” as words that “derive their 
meaning from the role they play in the process of criticism, a process of 
thinking and discussion which sustains or destroys the persuasiveness of 
argument. To say that an argument is valid is to claim that when subjected to 
an indefinite amount of criticism it is persuasive for everyone who thinks in 
the normal way” (p. 99).  
3 I underwrite the view, advocated by Hitchcock (2013) and Finocchiaro 
(2011), that it is indispensable for the development of argumentation theory 
to study cases of argumentation as they occur in natural contexts, rather than 
only artificial examples. In this study, however, I am to sketch the outlines of 
a dialogical account of counterconsiderations, and I consider it to be a 
legitimate starting point to do so by means of a number of simplified 
examples. To what extent the results apply to the complexities of real-life 
argumentation is left for different occasions. 
4 The more involved examples are “solo-arguments,” as Blair uses the term, 
i.e., arguments that reach a particular level of internal structure and 
complexity (1998, p. 333). 
5 Cf. Finocchiaro 1980, on “active evaluation.” 
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manner (Krabbe and van Laar, 2011), as well as what the 
obligations of a critic amount to (van Laar, 2012; van Laar and 
Krabbe, 2013; van Laar 2014.). This paper attempts to extend 
this project in the theory of criticism, by conceiving of six types 
of complex argument as six different, fully responsive ways for 
an arguer to respond to or anticipate counterconsiderations from 
real or imagined opponents. A full response by an arguer, as 
understood here, is the kind of response to a 
counterconsideration where the arguer makes it clear for each of 
the counterconsideration's components whether he 
acknowledges it or whether he aims to refute it. A conductive 
argument of pattern 3, then, is the kind of argument where the 
arguer acknowledges the counterconsideration's correctness as 
well as its negative relevance to his thesis, but where he claims 
to be able to refute its sufficiency to defeat his argument. Given 
that more types of full responses are available to the arguer, my 
conceptual hypothesis is that conducive argument is (just) one 
of the fully responsive ways of taking counterconsiderations into 
account, and that each of these types merit equal attention in the 
theory of argumentation. 
 I will first deal with the ways in which an opponent may 
actively criticize the proponent's position by advancing a 
counterconsideration (Section 2). Second, I will discuss in what 
ways the proponent can try to refute the counterconsideration, 
and how each of these ways of refutation may be wrapped up in 
an argument (Section 3). Third, I will proceed by listing the six 
ways in which the proponent can react in a fully responsive 
manner to a counterconsideration, and the six corresponding 
kinds of fully responsive arguments (Section 4). Finally, I will 
conclude (among other things): that the distinct patterns of 
conductive arguments correspond to distinct dialogue patterns; 
that pattern 3 conductive argument is just one member of a 
family of fully responsive arguments; that the weighing 
metaphor is not essential to grasping pattern 3 conductive 
argument; and that a full-fledged dialogical perspective is 
capable of providing an adequate account of conductive 
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2. Putting counterconsiderations to use 
 
Consider an argumentative dialogue, along the lines of the 
norms for persuasion dialogue,6 where the participants are trying 
to resolve their differences of opinion on the merits of both 
sides, as they perceive those merits. Suppose, the proponent 
asserts as his standpoint that “you should take your son to the 
movies.” His opponent, then, may want to challenge his thesis 
and hear the proponent’s arguments: “Why so?”7 Yet, if the 
proponent does not fully understand the opponent’s critical 
stance—that is, he does not understand what motivates her 
challenge, he lacks information that would be of use to him 
when trying to devise a convincing argument that answers her 
doubts. In such a situation, the proponent should be allowed to 
request the opponent to explain her challenge: “Explain (Why 
so?),” and the opponent may want to answer that question by 
explaining her motivation for being critical. The proposition that 
provides the explanation is - what I will refer to as - a 
“counterconsideration.”8 In our example, the opponent might 
explain her motivation by advancing as a counterconsideration: 
“My lawn needs to be cut,” or equivalently, but in a questioning 
mode “How about my lawn needing to be cut?” Of course, an 
opponent may also choose to speed up the dialogue and 
anticipate such a request from her proponent, adding the 
counterconsideration to her challenge spontaneously, in which 
case we can say that she has advanced, what Krabbe calls, a 
“bound challenge” (Krabbe 2007). I will also speak of a “bound 
challenge” if its two parts are distributed over two of the 
opponent’s turns. 
Such a counterconsideration does not stand on its own, 
but always accompanies the expression of critical doubt or a 
critical reaction of some other type, such as the expression of an 
opposite standpoint. I will restrict myself to 
counterconsiderations that accompany challenges, i.e., bound 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Cf. Critical Discussion (van Eemeren and Grootendorst 2004), Permissive 
Persuasion Dialogue (Walton and Krabbe, 1995) and Basic Critical 
Discussion (van Laar 2007). 
7 In this paper, a critical reaction of the form "Why T?" expresses a request 
for argumentation, and of consequence critical doubt. It does not express a 
request for an explanation, which requires a separate locution type.  
8 Unless the proposition attacked had the status of a presumptive 
commitment, the opponent is not under a dialectical obligation to provide 
such an explanation, even though such an explanation would enhance the 
quality of the dialogue (van Laar and Krabbe 2013). 
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challenges of the form "Why T? How about C?" I will analyse 
this combination of locutions by specifying its illocutionary 
force, its propositional focus, the norm it appeals to, and the 
level of dialogue it engages (for characterising critical reactions 
by means of force, focus, norm and level, see: Krabbe and van 
Laar, 2011).  
  
The illocutionary force of a bound challenge 
 
How about counterconsiderations that accompany the 
opponent’s challenge? Following van Eemeren and 
Grootendorst (2004), a challenge will be understood as a speech 
act that is a request for argumentation, performed by the 
opponent as part of her individual task to show that a critical 
stance towards the proponent's main thesis is consistent and 
tenable, notwithstanding the propositions that she has conceded 
or will be prepared to concede.  
 The counterconsideration “C,” when advanced in 
response to a proposition “T,”9 suggests a reasoning "C, if C 
then not-T, therefore not-T." If the opponent uses this reasoning 
to express argumentation, she has advanced 
counterargumentation.10 Yet, the counterconsideration need not 
be used to express genuine argumentation, and I will focus on 
those situations where it does not, for the reason of showing, if 
only sideways, that even in a persistently non-mixed, a-
symmetrical discussion11 with an opponent who merely doubts, 
and critically tests the proponent’s position from that 
perspective, critical reactions can be active (Finocchiaro, 1980, 
p. 339) and directive (van Laar and Krabbe, 2013). Even if the 
counterconsideration does not constitute counterargumentation, 
it aims to defeat the proponent’s argument (cf. Pollock, 1995) 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 As I will explain in more detail below, “T” can be the proponent's main 
thesis, or a subordinate thesis, or it can be a connection premise associated 
with his argument. 
10 In that case, the reasoning from "C" to "not-T" has the apparent purpose of 
convincing the proponent to accept "not-T," on the basis of what he is 
prepared to concede, so that the opponent becomes a second proponent.  
11 Van Eemeren and Grootendorst characterize a non-mixed difference of 
opinion as one where only one standpoint has been advanced. The other side, 
then, has merely expressed critical doubt regarding this standpoint (2004, pp. 
119-120). 
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insofar as the proponent must give up or develop a different line 
of defence, if he is unable to refute the counterconsideration. 
Thus, in my usage of those terms, the opponent tries to defeat 
the proponent’s arguments (without needing to incur any burden 
of proof), whereas the proponent discharges his burden of proof 
by trying to refute the opponent’s counterconsiderations. A 
counterconsideration is expressive of two different, yet related 
messages.  
 First, as we have seen, a counterconsideration expresses 
what underlies, and motivates the opponent's critical stance. In 
other words, it explains to the proponent how she considers her 
position to be a tenable position, notwithstanding her 
concessions: That the lawn needs cutting explains why she 
would not be required to go to the movies with her son. 
Second, with a counterconsideration the opponent directs 
the proponent to elaborate on or even save his position by 
refuting this very counterconsideration, or else, to give up his 
thesis “T.” Thus, within an argumentative setting, a 
counterconsideration provides an explanation and, additionally, 
strategic advice about the kind of argumentation that could turn 
out to be convincing to the opponent, or at least eradicate one 
reason for doubt. If the proponent wants to convince his 
opponent, he needs to show that the lawn needs no cutting, or, 
alternatively, that its needing cutting does not defeat his view 
that his addressee needs to go to the movies with her son. To 
grasp this latter, directive function of counterconsiderations, I 
will elaborate on the ways in which the proponent can refute a 
counterconsideration, in Section 3.12 
 There are two ways in which an opponent can convey an 
explanatory counterconsideration. (a) First, she may express a 
counterconsideration with a “cautious assertion,” that is, a 
proposition of the form “P is the case for all that you (the 
adversary) have shown” or “P’s being the case is compatible 
with everything you’ve said (i.e., have maintained or conceded)” 
(Rescher 1977, p. 6). In our example, the opponent might be 
taken as cautiously asserting three propositions: "As far as 
you've shown, the lawn might need cutting, which could, as far 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 In addition to the primary function of motivating one’s doubt, and the 
secondary function of giving (willingly or not) strategic advice, advancing a 
counterconsideration also may serve, depending on the situation, purposes 
that are less central to its nature, such as showing one’s willingness to resolve 
the issue, or emphasizing the width of the gap between participants, or 
showing one’s knowledge on the subject, and so on. 
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as you've shown, be a reason not to go to the movies with my 
son. Therefore, as far as you've shown, I should not go to the 
movies with my son.” 13 Thus, by advancing a cautious 
assertion, one does not incur the obligation to offer proof upon 
the proponent’s request. (b) Second, she can offer her 
counterconsiderations in a purely questioning mode: “Why T? 
How about C? Might C be true? And could C imply not-T?" In 
our example, the opponent might utter: "How about the lawn? 
Could it need cutting, and could that be a reason for me not to 
go to the movies with my son?” In argumentative contexts, the 
function of the counterconsideration in both presentational 
modes is the same: To get the proponent either to give in, or to 
refute "C," in some way or another and to elaborate on his 
argument by doing so. I will refer to both ways of presenting a 
counterconsideration as cautious assertion. Yet, the function is  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 Counterconsideration “C,” when advanced in explanation of a challenge to 
a thesis “T” is close to what Rescher labels a "provisoed denial," where a 
proposition “C” is cautiously asserted together with a (defeasible) inference 
from “C” to the denial of the interlocutor's thesis “T” (1977, p. 9). 
Counterconsideration “C,” when advanced in explanation of a challenge to 
the argumentative connection of the proponent's argument "U, therefore T" is 
similar to Rescher's notion of a “weak distinction” (p. 12). In Rescher’s 
system, a weak distinction is  of the form: “not-T/(C&U) & †(C&U)," where	  
X/Y means that X obtains, other things being equal, when  Y does (p. 6), 
where “†(C&U)” indicates that “C&U” is cautiously asserted, where “T” is 
the thesis defended by the proponent, where “U” is the reason that the 
proponent had advanced in support of “T,” and where “C” is, what I label, 
the counterconsideration advanced by the opponent. Rescher makes the 
opponent repeat the proponent’s reason in favour of “T” in her weak 
distinction against “T.” An advantage of Rescher’s way of presenting a 
counterconsideration focused on an argumentative connection is that it 
succinctly indicates the opponent’s view on the logical connection between 
on the one hand “C” and “U,” and on the other “not-T” (See also the way 
Freeman conceives of the warrants for pattern 3 conductive arguments, 2011, 
p. 135). But a disadvantage is that it is only to be grasped from the previous 
dialogue moves that “U” has the dialectical function to support “T,” but that 
“C” functions as a critical counterconsideration against “T.” In order to 
emphasize, what Rescher himself labels, probative asymmetries, I will not 
adopt his method of presenting counterconsiderations. In note 27, I explain 
that my way of modelling a counterconsideration that explain the opponent’s 
challenge to the proponent’s argumentative connection is, when translated to 
the language of propositional logic, equivalent to Rescher’s way of modelling 
a weak distinction. 
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not, as in the case of counterargumentation, to convince the 
proponent to accept a position opposite to his own.14 
 In what way, if any, can the opponent nevertheless be 
said to be committing herself to “C” and to the connection 
between “C” and the denial of the proponent’s thesis in those 
situations where she presents her counterconsideration 
cautiously? As we saw, it cannot be the kind of commitment that 
brings the obligation to defend, if challenged by one’s 
interlocutor. The opponent need not act as a second proponent. 
But neither are “C” and the connection between “C” and “not-
T” the kind of propositional material that the proponent can 
make use of in his attempts to convince the opponent,15 and thus 
it is also not to be characterized as being a kind of concession 
either. Rather, the kind of commitment that a cautiously asserted 
counterconsideration leads to should be specified in even 
weaker terms. According to my proposal, the opponent, after 
having challenged thesis “T” and after having advanced the 
cautiously asserted counterconsideration “C,” becomes 
committed to “C” and to “If C then not-T” in the weak sense 
that if the proponent successfully refutes counterconsideration 
“C” in either of three admissible ways (specified in Section 3), 
the opponent should abandon her critical strategy either (a) by 
declaring that she has been convinced of the acceptability or 
defensibility of “T,” or (b) by initiating a new line of criticism, 
for instance by challenging a different part of the proponent's 
argumentation, or (c) by maintaining her challenge of “T” but 
now with a new counterconsideration. We might dub this kind 
of commitment, putting Rescher’s terminology to new use, a 
"cautious commitment" and the opponent’s reasoning "C 
therefore not-T" a piece of "cautious reasoning."16  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 It is also possible for the opponent to strongly assert the connection 
between “C” and “not-T,” but to cautiously assert “C” itself, or vice versa. It 
is also possible to strongly deny “T”, yet to merely motivate the denial by 
means of cautious assertions, rather than advancing a counterargumentation. 
For the sake of simplicity, I assume that the full reasoning that underlies a 
counterconsideration (“C and if C then not-T, therefore not-T”) is advanced 
in a cautious mode. 
15 Generally, it is the denial of a counterconsideration, but not the 
counterconsideration itself that might  be used profitably by the proponent in 
his attempts to convince the opponent.  
16 If a counterconsideration is strongly asserted, it constitutes 
counterargumentation. In that case it has, normally in addition to an 
explanatory and an advisory function, also a third function, to wit: to 
persuade the interlocutor (the first proponent) on the basis of propositions 
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The propositional focus of a critical reaction is the proposition, 
or the set of propositions, that is negatively evaluated in the 
critical reaction, or that awaits negative evaluation if the critical 
reaction is not responded to satisfactorily.  
The bound challenge can first be focused on an assertion 
“T” that functions as the proponent’s main thesis, or as a reason 
within his argument. In such cases, the bound challenge 
constitutes "tenability criticism" (Krabbe and van Laar 2011; cf. 
Krabbe 2007).  
If the proponent has offered reason “U” for “T,” then the 
proponent can be considered to be committed to the 
argumentative connection between “U” and “T.” The opponent 
can, secondly, focus her bound challenge on this connection, 
that I call the argument’s “connection premise.”17 This 
connection will be referred to as “U⇒T,” where the arrow 
denotes that a commitment on the opponent’s part to “U” leads 
or should lead, within the current circumstances, to a 
commitment to “T.” A commitment by the opponent to “U⇒T” 
means that she acknowledges that if she were committed to "U" 
then this would be sufficient reason, within the circumstances at 
hand, for also committing herself to "T," it being dialectically 
untenable for her to remain committed to "U" yet challenging 
"T" at the same time.18 As the proponent commits himself to the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
that he has conceded or that he should be willing to concede. Note that a 
counterargumentation can be merely ex concessis, and thereby not expressive 
of the speaker’s motivations. Thus, not all counterargumentation includes an 
explanatory counterconsideration. 
17 Admittedly, the proposition that expresses the connection only becomes a 
real premise when the proponent makes it explicit or offers support for it, for 
example in response to the opponent connection criticism. 
18	  As	  we	  have	  seen	  in	  a	  previous	  note,	  "X/Y",	  in	  Rescher	  terminology	  means	  
"X	   obtains,	   other	   things	   being	   equal,	   when	   Y	   does"	   (p.	   6).	   This	   means,	  
Rescher	  elaborates,	  that	  both	  "X/Y"	  and	  "not-­‐X/Y&Z"	  can	  be	  true,	  according	  
to	   a	  dialogue	  participant.	   In	  other	  words,	   “X/Y”	   can	  be	   seen	  as	  expressing	  
that	   “Y”	   is	   relevant	   evidence	   for	   “Y.”In	   my	   notation,	   "U⇒T	   ,”	   means	  
something	   different,	   namely	   that	   premise	   "U"	   suffices,	   within	   the	   current	  
circumstances,	   for	  the	  opponent	  to	  accept	  "T,"	   if	  she	  would	  accept	  "U,"	  so	  
that	   it	  would	   be	   incoherent	   on	   her	   part	   to	   accept	   both	   "U⇒T"	   as	  well	   as	  
"(U∧S)⇒not-T." In other words, when the opponent commits herself to 
"U⇒T," she concedes that, all things considered, a commitment to "U" ought 
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conditional statement “U⇒T” by advancing his argument, 19 the 
opponent can always raise a bound challenge such as "Why 
U⇒T? How about C?" In such cases, the bound challenge 
constitutes "connection criticism" (cf. Krabbe 2007). 
 
Norm 
Given that a critical reaction contains a negative evaluation, or 
at least prepares for it, it must appeal to a norm of some kind, 
and the (prospective) evaluation is based on that yardstick. 
 Like a pure challenge, a bound challenge can best be 
seen as appealing to a rule for reasonable discussion according 
to which a proponent should, if so requested, offer an argument 
in favour of whatever is challenged (such as the “Obligation-to-
Defend Rule,” van Eemeren and Grootendorst, 2004). For it is 
up to the proponent to refute the counterconsideration, and in 
that way argue in favour of his thesis. 
 In addition, by steering the proponent to develop his 
argument by means of refuting the counterconsideration, the 
opponent can also be seen as appealing to an optimality rule. An 
optimality rule is the kind of rule with which we can distinguish, 
among admissible non-fallacious moves, between those of 
higher and those of lower quality, such as those arguments that 
are more and those that are less convincing (Krabbe 2002). By 
advancing a bound challenge, the opponent directs the 
proponent to advance arguments that she, apparently, considers 




	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
to bring a commitment to "T." Of course, the opponent can also commit 
herself of such a connection, if she conceives of the connection as defeasible 
in the sense that in other circumstances “U” would not suffice for “T.” 
19 The proponent can support the conditional sentence, “U⇒T,” associated 
with the proponent's argument, by advancing a generalization of this 
conditional sentence, its warrant. However, the proponent may also support 
this conditional statement in a different way, such as by stating that some 
expert in the field has stated that “T, if U,” or by advancing that "If V then T 
and if U then V," neither of which counts as a generalization of the associated 
conditional. In other words, I adopt a particularist stance, and not a 
generalist one, with regard to the issue of whether the proponent is always 
committing himself to a generalization of the particular connection between 
the premises and conclusion of his argument (see for particularist positions: 
Verheij 2006;  and Bermejo-Luque 2004; See for generalist positions: 
Hitchcock 2007, and Govier 2011). 
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Dialogical contributions that quite directly contribute to the 
development or the dismantling of the proponent’s 
argumentation, such as arguments and challenges, can be seen 
as taking place at the ground level dialogue, i.e., the dialogue 
about the issue at hand. Those contributions, however, that are 
about the legitimacy of dialogue moves (e.g.: has a fallacy been 
committed?), or about the institutional legitimacy (e.g.: has the 
legal evidence been obtained by admissible means?), or about 
matters of strategy (e.g.: will this line of defence lead to a 
convincing case?), can be seen as only quite indirectly 
contributing to the development or dismantling of the 
proponent’s case, and are thereby to be located at a metalevel 
dialogue.  
Leaving special cases out of consideration, bound 
challenges normally are ground level contributions, 
notwithstanding the strategic flavour that the message of 
strategic advice conveys. 
 
 
3. Refuting a counterconsideration 
 
A proponent can try to refute a counterconsideration “C” in 
three principal ways. First, the proponent can do so by denying 
the correctness of the counterconsideration, and argue in favour 
of that denial. Second, he can do so by denying the sufficiency 
of “C” to defeat his thesis “T”, i.e., by denying that “not-T, if 
C,” and argue in favour of that denial.20 While dealing with 
these first two options for the proponent, we will find that, when 
a proponent tries to refute more than one counterconsideration 
consecutively, the result may be an argument “in which 
premises are put forward as separately and non-conclusively 
relevant to support a conclusion,” i.e., a conductive argument, as 
conceived of by Govier (Govier, 2011, p. 262; See also: Govier, 
1999, p. 155). A third way to refute a counterconsideration “C” 
amounts to claiming that the counterconsideration can be 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 A special way to refute "C" as insufficient to defeat "T" is to claim that "C" 
is not even negatively relevant to "T." I return to this special option in 
Section 4. 
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dismissed for being too far-fetched, so that it need not be taken 
into account. 
When dealing with these three options, I will also discuss 
how the resulting dialogues can be, as it were, wrapped up in 
what Blair might call a solo-argument (Blair, 1998, p. 333). I 
treat such a complex argument as an implicit dialogue where the 
writer or speaker takes the primary responsibility for the tasks to 
be fulfilled by the proponent who anticipates or responds to 
critical reactions that he himself, as a writer or speaker, makes 
available in the text, as it were in the service of the opponent 
(van Eemeren and Grootendorst, 1992, p. 43; Krabbe, 2002; van 
Laar, 2007).21 
First, I deal with the ways to refute a 
counterconsideration that is part of a tenability criticism, which 
is focused on the main or on a subordinate thesis. Second, I deal 
with the ways to refute a counterconsideration that is part of a 
connection criticism, which is focused on a specific 
argumentative connection of the proponent’s arguments. 
 
3.1 Counterconsiderations focused on a standpoint or 
substandpoint 
 
Refuting the counterconsideration as false 
 
Suppose the opponent challenged “T,” where “T” is either the 
main standpoint, or a reason that, by being challenged, has 
turned into a substandpoint. And suppose she adds "Counter C," 
which, as we have seen, can be analyzed as a full reasoning of 
the form (from now on I use short-hands) “C and C⇒¬T, 
therefore ¬T” (where we assume that both premises of the 
reasoning and its conclusion are asserted cautiously). In such a 
situation, the proponent may choose to take responsibility for 
the falsity of “C,” and assert to that purpose the denial of “C,” 
which, if challenged, must itself be argued for, thus generating 





	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 Note that also pure challenges invite the proponent to offer similar 
argumentative structures, many of which are discussed by Snoeck 
Henkemans (1992). 
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Opponent: Why T? Counter C. 
Proponent: ¬C 
Opponent: Why ¬C? 




For example, if the opponent challenges “You ought to go to the 
movies with your son (T)” by countering "Why would I? As far 
as you've shown, I don’t owe him that (Why T? Counter C),” 
then the proponent may try to refute it by denying it: "You do! 
(not-C)." If challenged, this denial stands in need of defence 
itself: "For, you promised him to go (U).” 
The denial of “C” becomes part of the proponent's 
defence of his thesis, and if wrapped up in a quasi-monological 
argument, the result could read: "You ought to take your son to 
the movies (T), because you owe him that (¬C ),"22 which I will 
refer to as a complex argument of type 1.  
 
T, because ¬C. ¬C, because U. 
 
Figure 2. A complex argument of type 1 
 
In such a situation, would the proponent claim to have offered a 
sufficient set of premises to convince the opponent? Possibly, 
but not necessarily. Minimally, the proponent's claim is that one 
motivation for being critical should have been taken away, but 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 According to Finocchiaro, “the conjunction of an objection and its 
corresponding reply, (O-j & R-j), or some appropriately reworded phrasing 
of it that might be needed for grammatical propriety (…) would constitute a 
reason supporting the conclusion C” (2005, p. 321). Note that from my 
dialectical and particularist viewpoint, the refutation of a 
counterconsideration also counts as an argument if the counterconsideration 
is strongly tied to the context of the dialogue, and no plausible law-like 
generalization that would imply the specific connection premise of the 
argument would be available. Thus, if the counterconsideration would be 
“My lawn needs a cutting,” the resulting argument would be “You should 
bring your son to the movies, because your lawn does not need a cutting,” 
which is in the context of use a potentially convincing and reasonable 
argument. 
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he may recognise the possibility that the opponent may have 
other grounds for being critical towards his thesis, and so he 
may, in his own view, not have discharged his burden of proof 
regarding “T” in each and every respect. On the other hand, the 
proponent does seem to claim that his reason “¬C” does help to 
convince the opponent of his thesis “T,” in the sense that he 
could elaborate on and extend his case for “T,” such that the 
final result is an argument with a set of premises that, taken 
together, are or should be sufficiently convincing for this 
opponent. In other words, by refuting “C” as false, the 
proponent has offered a reason in favour of his thesis “T,” such 
that it can be supplemented with further premises resulting in a 
set of premises that, if all are accepted by the opponent, would 
make a critical stance towards “T” untenable. In such a 
situation, an arguer can be said, to use Govier's terminology 
(Govier 1999; 2011, p. 268; See also Section 5), to have offered 
a positively relevant yet not per se a conclusive support for his 
conclusion.  
Whereas Govier conceptualizes positive relevance of 
proposition “P” for proposition “T” in terms of the availability 
of a ceteris paribus generalization such that the specific 
connection between “P” and “T” forms a special case (1999, p. 
171), I define positive relevance in terms of a particularist 
notion of sufficiency.  The set of propositions “P1,P2,…,Pn”  is 
sufficient for proposition “T,” for a participant within a 
particular dialogical situation, if and only if this participant in 
this situation commits herself to “(P1∧P2∧…∧Pn)⇒T,” or would 
do so if requested. The positive relevance of a reason for “T” 
can then be clarified with this notion of sufficiency. Proposition 
“P1” is positively relevant to proposition “T” for a participant in 
a particular dialogue context, if and only if for the participant in 
that particular dialogue context, either “P1“ would, if acceptable, 
provide sufficient support (defeasibly or not) for “T,” or if there 
are propositions “P2,…,Pn” available to the participant such that 
“P1,P2,…,Pn” would, if they all would be acceptable, provide 
sufficient support (defeasibly or not) for “T,” whereas 
“P2,…,Pn” would not.” 23 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 Blair's notion of “premissary relevance” is close to this notion of relevance, 
yet differs in three respects. First, in his view, a premise “P1”, to be relevant 
to “T,” must really lend support to the thesis “T”, whereas in my view it 
suffices if the receiver of the argument thinks so. Second, in his view the 
other propositions, “P2,…,Pn, ” which together with “P1” are sufficient to 
support “T,” have been asserted by the proponent, whereas in my view it 
Arguments that take Counterconsiderations into Account 
	  
 




After having been refuted by the proponent, the opponent might 
advance a new counterconsideration, “D”, in a second attempt to 
explain how her critical stance towards “T” constitutes a tenable 
position.24 If the proponent also attempts to refute “D” as false, 
“¬D” must be seen as a second reason in favour of “T,” also 
being positively relevant to “T” and the two thus generated 
reasons constitute the proponent’s “convergent”25 argument for 
“T”: “T, because both ¬C and ¬D," if at least the two 
counterconsiderations had been dissimilar enough. 
 
 
Refuting the counterconsideration as insufficient to defeat the 
argument 
A second way of trying to refute the opponent’s 
counterconsideration would be to deny that “C,” if true, would 
undermine the proponent's thesis ”T.” For example, if the 
proponent reasons "You ought to take your son to this movie 
(T)," and the opponent challenges it, adding that "the lawn 
might need to be cut (C)," then the proponent may, regardless of 
whether “T” is the main thesis or a subordinate one, try to refute 
it by denying that thesis “T” is false if the counterconsideration 
“C” is true: "It is quite possible that you ought to take your son 
to this movie, even though your lawn does need cutting 
(¬(C⇒¬T)).” In this way, the proponent denies that the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
suffices if these additional premises are in some way or other available in the 
dialogue context. Third, in his view, the proponent himself should consider 
“P1,P2,…,Pn” to provide sufficient support, whereas in my view, the 
possibility of a purely ex concessis argument would suffice to make “P1” 
relevant to “T” (Blair, 1992, p. 205). 
24 Note that the opponent might acknowledge the proponent’s reason “¬C” as 
positively relevant to his thesis “T” even when she entertains a second 
counterconsideration “D,” for in her view there might be a list of 
propositions, among which “¬D” such that when “¬C” is added to the list, 
“T” should be accepted as true, if all propositions in this list were acceptable. 
25 In a convergent argument each reason advanced by the proponent provides 
a positively relevant consideration such that each remains positively relevant 
also when the others are taken away from the argument,	  and such that each of 
the individual reasons does not suffice to support the conclusion, whereas, or 
so it is claimed by the proponent of that kind of argument, the	  collection of 
all individual reasons do sufficiently converge towards the acceptance of the 
thesis (See for a terminological survey: Snoeck Henkemans, 2001, pp. 111-
116).  
    Jan Albert van Laar    
	  
© Jan Albert van Laar, Informal Logic, Vol. 34, No. 3 (2014), pp. 240-275.	  
	  
256
opponent's counterconsideration is sufficient to defeat his case. 
On the opponent's request, the proponent should argue in its 
favour: "for the picture will be gone tomorrow (U).”26 
 
Proponent: T 
Opponent: Why T? Counter C. 
Proponent: ¬(C⇒¬T) 
Opponent: Why ¬(C⇒¬T)? 




When wrapped as a complex argument, where the opponent's 
moves are left implicit, the argument might read: “You ought to 
take your son to this movie (T), since because it will be gone by 
tomorrow (U), even if your lawn needs cutting you really should 
go there with your son (¬(C⇒¬T)),” which I will refer to as a 
complex argument of type 2. 
 
T, because ¬(C⇒¬T). ¬(C⇒¬T), because U. 
 





	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 The refutation of a counterconsideration as insufficient to defeat an 
argument resembles Rescher’s notion of a “strong distinction,” which is like 
a weak distinction, but now advanced by the proponent in such a way that he 
incurs a genuine burden of proof: “T/(C&U) & !(C&U)," where X/Y means 
that X obtains, other things being equal, when  Y does, where “!(C&U)” 
indicates that “C&U” is categorically asserted, where “T” is the thesis 
defended by the proponent, where “U” is the reason that the proponent 
advances in support of “T,” and where “C” is, what I label, the 
counterconsideration, and which is overridden by “U.” Like in the case of a 
weak distinction, Rescher makes the proponent say: “I affirm that both U and 
C, and the conjunction of U and C constitutes a good reason for T" (cf. 
Rescher, 1977, p. 12), whereas in the framework proposed here, the 
proponent is saying something like "I affirm that U, and U is a good reason 
for denying that C is a good reason for not-T". When translated to formulae 
in the language of first-order propositional logic, both responses are 
equivalent: "(U∧C) ∧ ((U ∧C) →T))" and "U∧(U →¬(C →¬T))." In other 
words: Rescher’s notion of a strong distinction can be reduced to the 
dialectical terminology that I employ here. 
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3.2 Counterconsiderations focused on a connection premise 
 
Refuting the counterconsideration as false 
Suppose the proponent argues that "You ought to buy two 
tickets for the movies, because you are taking your son to the 
movies (T, because U),” and the opponent challenges the 
argument's connection premise, saying "Why should I buy two 
tickets for the movies if I take my son to the movies? As far as 
you’ve shown, you could buy us these tickets! (Why U⇒T? 
Counter C).” Then the proponent has the option to refute the 
counterconsideration as false or unacceptable, "I can't buy you 
these tickets (¬C),” possibly also arguing in favour of its 




Opponent: Why T? 
Proponent: U 
Opponent: Why U⇒T? Counter C. 
Proponent: ¬C        (as a reason for U⇒T) 
Opponent: Why ¬C? 




This attempt at refutation, again, functions as part of the 
proponent's defence of his thesis, which can be seen when 
wrapping it up as a complex argument: "You ought to buy two 
tickets for the movies. If you are to take your son there, which 
you are, it’s you who needs to buy tickets, since because I’m out 
of money, I can’t do so for you” or more naturally, by leaving 
the intermediate thesis implicit: "If you are to take your son to 
the movies, which you are, it’s you who needs to buy tickets, for 
I’m out of money,” which I will refer to as a complex argument 
of type 3.27 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 As explained in Note 13, the opponent’s move would, in Rescher’s 
terminology, amount to a weak distinction: “not-T/(C&U) & †(C&U).” A 
weak distinction, when translated to the language of propositional logic, 
would read: "(U ∧C) ∧ ((U ∧C) →¬T))." In my dialogue, the reasoning of 
the opponent when offering her counterconsideration could be translated to: 
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T, because U. U⇒T, because ¬C. ¬C , because V. 
 
Figure 6. Complex argument of type 3 
 
The proponent may make his argument more concise by leaving 
“U⇒T” (or even “U⇒T, because ¬C”) implicit, so that “¬C” 
(or even “V”) is simply added to the initial reason “U”: " You 
ought to buy two tickets for the movies, because first, you ought 
to take your son to the movies, and second–being out of money 
– I can’t buy them for you." 28 
 
Refuting the counterconsideration as insufficient to defeat 
Suppose the proponent argues that "You ought to take your son 
to the movies, because the picture is ideal for children (T, 
because U)” and the opponent responds with a challenge 
focused on the connection premise, adding the 
counterconsideration that "my lawn needs cutting (Why U⇒T? 
Counter C).” Then the proponent may want to refute the 
counterconsideration’s sufficiency to defeat his argument, for 
instance by saying: "You ought to take your son to the movies if 
the picture is ideal for children, even though the lawn may need 
cutting," and he can advance this as a reason to support the 
initial connection premise (U⇒T, because ¬(C⇒¬(U⇒T))). 
 Again, he may give a reason in support of the claim that 
the counterconsideration is insufficient to defeat his argument: 





	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
"U ∧ (U →¬(C →¬T)).” Both formulae are, as stated in Note 26, equivalent. 
In other words: Rescher’s notion of a weak distinction can be reduced to the 
dialectical terminology that I employ here. 
28 Of course, the proponent may also consider just accepting the correctness 
of the counterconsideration, as well as its sufficiency to defeat his argument, 
and repair his apparently incomplete argument by augmenting his argument 
with a fresh new reason, hoping that the resulting argument has a connection 
premise that is acceptable: "You ought to buy two tickets for the movies, 
because first, you ought to take your son to the movies, and second you have 
enough money for buying it." In that case, the proponent has not tried to 
refute the counterconsideration, but accepted its force, and repairs his flawed 
argument accordingly. 
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Opponent: Why U⇒T? Counter C. 
Proponent: ¬(C⇒¬(U⇒T))   (as a reason for U⇒T)   
Opponent: Why ¬(C⇒¬ (U⇒T))? 




This corresponds to the following kind of complex argument: 
“You ought to take your son to the movies (T), because the 
picture is ideal for children (U). And you should, given that it’s 
ideal (U⇒T), because you should (this being so) even though 
your lawn may need cutting (¬(C⇒¬(U⇒T))), because the 
picture will be gone tomorrow (V),” which I will refer to as a 
complex argument of type 5.” 
 
T, because U. U⇒T, because ¬(C⇒¬(U⇒T)). 
¬(C⇒¬(U⇒T)), because V 
 
Figure 8. Complex argument of type 4 
 
Again, the proponent may choose to make his argument more 
concise by leaving “U⇒T” (or even “U⇒T, because 
¬(C⇒¬(U⇒T))”) implicit, so that “¬(C⇒¬(U⇒T))” (or even 
“V”) is simply added to the initial reason “U”:  “You ought to 
take your son to the movies (T), because the picture is ideal for 
children (U) and, given that the picture will be gone tomorrow 
(V), your lawn needing cutting should not refrain you from 
doing so (¬(C⇒¬(U⇒T))).” 
 
 
Refuting a counterconsideration as dismissible 
  
The proponent may hold that "C" is overly far-fetched, 
contrived, indicative only of an abnormal situation, and thereby 
not really in need of a more substantial type of refutation. Even 
if "C" indicates a situation where one can consistently maintain 
all the premises as concessions and yet challenge the conclusion, 
so that “C” proves the existence of a logical counterexample that 
shows the proponent’s reasoning to be logically invalid, this 
logical possibility may be too far removed from the kinds of 
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situations that need to be reckoned with, for the purposes of the 
participants at hand, and thereby insufficiently pertinent or 
realistic. Note that this only applies to defeasible reasoning on 
the proponent's part and that, if he himself claims to have 
offered a logically valid argument,29 this kind of refutation of a 
counterconsideration should not be available to him. 
 
 
4. Fully responsive ways of taking counterconsideration into 
account 
 
An attempt to refute the opponent’s counterconsideration in one 
of these ways is responsive to a certain extent, but such a 
response by the proponent need not yet be fully responsive, as I 
will use this term. The proponent’s reaction against the 
opponent’s counterconsideration would be fully responsive if he 
makes it clear for each of the components of the opponent’s 
counterconsideration whether he wants to refute it or whether he 
refrains from doing so and acknowledges it. I deal here with 
“strong acknowledgement,” where the arguer himself recognizes 
a virtue of a counterconsideration, in distinction to “weak 
acknowledgement” where it is merely recognized that some 
other person recognizes or might recognize this positive feature 
(Govier 1999, pp. 155-156). In this section, I will list the fully 
responsive options, and examine how the resulting dialogues 
can be wrapped up in complex arguments. We will find that 
typical examples of conduction correspond to one of these types 
of full responses. With the aim to situate conductive argument 
among its close relatives, I list all six full responses to a 
counterconsideration. 
Disregarding situations where the proponent refutes a 
counterconsideration as dismissible, the proponent could be 
fully responsive by making it both clear whether he attempts to 
refute the counterconsideration’s acceptability, or whether he 
acknowledges it, and whether he attempts to refute its 
sufficiency to defeat a thesis, or whether he acknowledges it. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 This applies both to situations where he presents his reasoning as 
primitively valid, i.e. as having a conclusion that cannot be false in any 
conceivable world where its premises are true, which can be determined 
without needing to translate the reasoning to a formal language, and to 
situations where he presents his reasoning as formally valid, i.e. as 
instantiating a valid reasoning form, i.e. a form that does not allow of 
substitution instances where the premises are true and the conclusion false. 
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However, just as a reason "U" in the proponent’s argument can 
be positively relevant to the proponent’s (subordinate) thesis "T" 
without being a sufficient reason, so a counterconsideration “C” 
can be positively relevant to its conclusion, “¬T”, which can 
also be rephrased as “C” being negatively relevant to the 
proponent’s thesis “T” (cf. Govier 1999, p. 155). I will also take 
into account the option for the proponent to either try to refute 
or acknowledge the counterconsideration’s negative relevance 
vis-à-vis his thesis, both because this enhances the 
responsiveness of the proponent’s contribution and because the 
acknowledgement of negative relevance plays a role in those 
complex arguments that are commonly referred to as conductive 
arguments.30 
Before dealing with these options, it is good to examine 
in some more detail what it could mean to acknowledge a 
counterconsideration's negative relevance. In line with my view 
on the positive relevance of a reason to its conclusion, the 
acknowledgement of the negative relevance of "C1," in a 
particular context, amounts to a recognition to the effect that 
there are propositions "C2,…,Cn" available to the opponent such 
that if no “Ci" in "C1, C2,…,Cn," could be refuted as false by the 
proponent, the conjunction of "C1, C2,…,Cn" would successfully 
refute his (subordinate) thesis (or connection premise) “T.” If 
this acknowledgement of "C1’s" negative relevance is combined 
with an attempt to refute "C1’s" sufficiency to defeat, it could be 
taken as bad news to the opponent, in so-far as she did not (yet) 
succeed in finding an unanswerable critique, but also as an 
encouragement to extend her counterconsideration so that the 
final result (in the example: "C1,…,Cn") is irrefutable by the 
proponent.  
Given that it would be incoherent to acknowledge 
counterconsideration "C’s" sufficiency to defeat proposition 
“T,” and try to refute its negative relevance to “T,” there are six 
fully responsive options for the proponent: (a) acknowledging 
"C's" acceptability, negative relevance and sufficiency to defeat; 
(b) acknowledging its acceptability, and negative relevance, and 
denying its sufficiency to defeat; (c) acknowledging its 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 There are many other positive features of the counterconsideration that can 
be denied or acknowledged, such as its being ‘nicely phrased’ or ‘inventive,’ 
yet I will abstract from these other possible virtues of a counterconsideration. 
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acceptability, and denying its relevance and sufficiency to 
defeat; (d) denying its acceptability and sufficiency to defeat, 
and acknowledging its negative relevance; (e) denying its 
acceptability, and acknowledging its relevance and sufficiency 
to defeat; (f) denying all - and these will be discussed in turn.31 
In the examples, I will for the main part focus on those fully 
responsive reactions against a counterconsideration that focuses 
on a (subordinate) thesis, and refrain from discussing a 
proponent who needs to defend his connection premise.  
 (a) The proponent may concede defeat, or at least partial 
defeat, by acknowledging “C’s” acceptability, negative 
relevance and sufficiency to defeat. In that case, he should either 
develop a new line of defence of his thesis, or give up his 
position: “Yes, I guess you’re right. I stand corrected.” 
 Wrapped up as a complex argument, if it can still be 
called an “argument,” the result might read: “I have been 
thinking that this book is a good buy, on account of its having a 
good story. However, pondering on the issue led me to think 
that it is very expensive, which, indeed, devastates my reason 
for considering it a good buy.” 
 (b) The proponent may acknowledge "C’s" acceptability 
and negative relevance, yet deny its sufficiency to defeat. So, 
the proponent might defend that “this book is a good buy.” 
Against the opponent, who puts forward as a 
counterconsideration “but it’s quite expensive, isn’t it?”, the 
proponent may acknowledge both its correctness and negative 
relevance by saying something to the effect that “Yes, you have 
a point. But it has an exciting story, and so it actually is a good 
buy,” in that way giving a reason in support of his claim that the 
counterconsideration is not sufficient to defeat his argument. 
The proponent can convey the acknowledgement of “C” 
being negatively relevant, simply by giving the positive reason 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 As Johnson, following Govier, uses the term, a counterconsideration is, by 
definition, really negatively relevant to the thesis at hand (Johnson 2011, p. 
59; Govier 2011, p. 267). According to the account in Krabbe and van Laar 
(2011), however, a counterconsideration is presented as negatively relevant 
by the opponent, and the proponent may disagree, yet without denying that 
the opponent’s proposition counts as a counterconsideration. This 
terminological divergence can be explained by Johnson’s and Govier’s 
assumption that a counterconsideration is part of an argument’s illative core, 
and by definition acknowledged as negatively relevant by the proponent of 
the argument in which it is mentioned, whereas Krabbe and van Laar also 
allow for a proposition being a counterconsideration if it is only the opponent 
who considers it to be (among other things) negatively relevant. 
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(“it has an exciting story”), in that way suggesting that when 
“C” would be added to “It does not have a good story” the 
resulting counterconsideration would be sufficient to defeat the 
argument, possibly after having extended the set of 
counterconsiderations even further. (Given that he considers the 
story exciting, not all premises would then be true, in the 
proponent’s view). The positive reason (“It has an exciting 
story”) supports the thesis at hand. But in this specific context, it 
does so in a subtle way, for it specifically conveys the message 
that “C” is negatively relevant, but insufficient to defeat the 
argument. In other words: “In a different dialogical situation, 
where the book would not have had an exciting story, the 
counterconsideration might have refuted the thesis. However, 
given that it has an exciting story, that’s not the case in the 
current situation.” 
Wrapped up as a complex argument, the result might 
read: “This book is a good buy. For although it is quite 
expensive, it has an exciting story.” What was in the previous 
section discussed as the proponent’s refutation of the 
counterconsideration as insufficient to defeat is included in this 
complex argument. This forms a variant of the argument of type 
2,32 albeit that it is more complex in containing an 
acknowledgement. 
If the proponent had already given an argument in favour 
of his thesis, and the opponent advances her 
counterconsideration as a criticism focused on the connection 
premise of that argument, then the new reason can be offered in 
addition to the acknowledgement of the counterconsideration’s 
correctness and negative relevance. For example “This book is a 
good buy, even though it is quite expensive. For the story is not 
only very exciting, but also very humorous.” In that case, the 
newly added reason can be seen as support for the denial of the 
counterconsideration's sufficiency to defeat the connection 
premise, and forms a concise variant of a complex argument of 
type 4.33 
 (c) The proponent could acknowledge "C’s" 
acceptability, but deny its relevance and sufficiency to defeat. If, 
for example, the opponent challenges the thesis “This is a good 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 See Figure 4. 
33 See Figure 8. 
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book” by countering that “it is quite expensive,” the proponent 
might respond: “Yes it is. However, that does not speak in any 
way against my thesis.” 
Wrapped up as a complex argument, the result might 
read: “This is a good book. Though it is quite expensive, its 
price does not speak against its quality in any way.” Again, what 
was in the previous section discussed as a complex argument of 
type 2 (or of type 4 if the counterconsideration focused on a 
connection premise)34 is included in this complex argument, if 
the proponent argues in support of his denial.35  
 (d) The proponent may deny "C’s" acceptability, and 
"C’s" sufficiency to defeat and acknowledge its negative 
relevance. If, for example, the opponent challenges the thesis 
“This book is a good buy” by countering “but it is quite 
expensive” the proponent might respond: “If it were expensive it 
would detract somewhat from my thesis, however without 
defeating it completely. By the way, it is not expensive at all.” 
Wrapped up as a complex argument, the result might 
read: “This book is a good buy. If it were expensive, it would 
detract somewhat from my thesis. But then, it isn't.” What was 
in the previous section discussed as the proponent’s refutation of 
the counterconsideration as insufficient to defeat (complex 
arguments of type 2, respectively of type 4, if the proponent's 
connection premise was attacked) and as false (of type 1,36 
respectively of type 3,37 in case of connection criticism) are both 
included in this complex argument if the proponent supports the 
denial of the counterconsideration's correctness and the denial of 
its sufficiency to defeat. 
 (e) The proponent may deny "C’s" acceptability, and 
acknowledge "C’s" relevance and sufficiency to defeat. If, for 
example, the opponent challenges the thesis “This book is a 
good buy” by countering “but it is very expensive” the 
proponent might respond: “If it were very expensive it would 
ruin my case. But, in my view, it’s quite cheap, really.”  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 See Figure 4, and Figure 8. 
35 Note that not only the acknowledgement of correctness and negative 
relevance, as in option b, can be conventionally indicated with the "even 
though" clause, but also the acknowledgement of just its correctness 
(different from what is suggested in Hansen 2011, pp. 42-48, and Adler 
2013). 
36 See Figure 2. 
37 See Figure 6. 
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 Wrapped up as a complex argument, the result might 
read: “This is a good buy. Of course, it would not be a good 
buy, if it would be very expensive. But then, it’s quite cheap, 
really.” This forms the beginning of a complex argument of type 
1 (or one of type 3 if the connection premise was at issue) if the 
proponent proceeds with supporting his denial of the 
counterconsideration. 
(f) The proponent may deny C’s acceptability, C’s 
sufficiency to defeat, as well as C’s negative relevance, 
responding with: “Utter and complete nonsense!” 
Wrapped up as a complex argument, the result might 
read: “This is a good book. One might counter that it is an 
expensive book. But that’s simply false, as well as utterly 
irrelevant.” What was discussed in the previous section as the 
proponent’s refutation of the counterconsideration as 
insufficient for defeat and as false are both included in this 
complex argument. 
 This completes the list of six fully responsive options for 
a proponent confronted with a counterconsideration from an 
opponent who manages to raise highly directive criticism, yet 
without adopting any standpoint of her own. 
 
 
5. Some conclusions about conduction 
 
Among those scholars who are attracted by the idea that 
conductive arguments form a separate type of argument, 
distinguishable from deduction and induction (see for example 
Wellman, 1971; Govier 1999, 2001), the issue of how to 
conceptualize conduction and define "conduction" has been 
discussed extensively. Govier defines conductive arguments as 
“arguments in which premises are put forward as separately and 
non-conclusively relevant to support a conclusion, against which 
negatively relevant considerations may also be acknowledged” 
(Govier, 2011, p. 262). It has been this conception of 
conduction, and closely related ones, that I have in mind when 
drawing some conclusions.  
 1. Conductive arguments of pattern 1 (see Introduction) 
are closely related to those complex arguments with which a 
proponent tries to refute one counterconsideration against his 
thesis as either false or as insufficient to defeat his argument, yet 
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without acknowledging the counterconsideration to be either 
correct, negatively relevant or sufficient to defeat (See Section 
3). What others would regard as part of the argument’s illative 
core (Johnson, 2011), is from a full-fledged dialectical point of 
view analysed as a response to a critical reaction, either real or 
imagined. Many, if not all argumentative uses of premise(s)-
conclusion complexes can be understood to have been generated 
in a dialogue in which an opponent advances a bound challenge, 
so that the proponent feels encouraged to refute the challenge’s 
counterconsideration, and to thus produce his premise(s). 
However, such arguments need not always constitute conduction 
for possibly, depending upon one's preferred conception of 
conduction, there are constraints on what may count as 
conduction, such as Wellman's requirement that all the 
argument's elements are about the same case without appeal to 
other cases, or Hitchcock's requirement that what is predicated 
in the argument's conclusion supervenes on what is predicated in 
the premises (2013).38 This same proviso applies to the next two 
conclusions. 
 2. Conductive arguments of pattern 2 are closely related 
to the complex arguments with which a proponent tries to refute 
more than one counterconsideration against his thesis as either 
false or as insufficient to defeat, so that it gives rise to two or 
more separately positively relevant reasons in favour of the 
proponent’s thesis, provided the refuted counterconsiderations 
have been relatively independent from one another (See Section 
3). 
 3. Conductive arguments of pattern 3 (labelled: "pro and 
con argument" by Fischer, 2011; "balance of considerations 
arguments" by Hansen, 2011; "appeal to considerations" by 
Hitchcock, 2013; “pro/con arguments” by Johnson, 2011, and 
by Paglieri, 2013) are related to the complex arguments with 
which the proponent gives that full response to a 
counterconsideration in which he acknowledges the 
counterconsideration as acceptable and as negatively relevant to 
his thesis, but where he tries to refute its sufficiency to defeat 
(See Section 4). 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 According to Hitchcock: “we can define conductive reasonings and 
arguments as those in which a supervenient status is attributed to a subject of 
interest on the basis of one or more features of that subject, with possible 
acknowledgement of features that count against the attribution" (Hitchcock 
2013, p. 206). 
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 Let’s first consider a simplified version of a Wellman’s 
argument of conduction: “Although your lawn needs cutting, 
you ought to take your son to the movies because the picture is 
ideal for children.” In this example the positive reason in favour 
of the thesis and the acknowledgement of the 
counterconsideration suggest that the counterconsideration is 
acknowledged as acceptable as well as negatively relevant for 
the thesis but not as sufficient to defeat.  The following dialogue 
can be seen to underlie it:  
 
Proponent: You ought to take your son to the movies (T). 
Opponent: Why? For all you've shown, my lawn needs cutting! 
(C) 
Proponent: Okay. But though your lawn might need cutting, you 
ought to go. (¬(C⇒¬T) ) 
Opponent: Why? 
Proponent Because the picture is ideal for children. (S) 
Dialogue 1.  
 
The argument diagram (where an arrow indicates that the 
proponent’s advances what is above the arrow as sufficient 
support for what is below the arrow) that captures this reading 
of the conductive argument is: 
 
      S 
 
  
¬(C⇒¬T)   
 
    





Thus, when it comes to diagramming of conductive argument, I 
would propose to just include the denial of the 
counterconsideration’s sufficiency to defeat as a premise node.  
 Let's now return to Wellman's full example: “Although 
your lawn needs cutting, you ought to take your son to the 
movies because the picture is ideal for children and will be gone 
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by tomorrow” (Wellman, 1971, p. 57). Due to the occurrence of 
two positive reasons, the example can be seen as containing an 
ambivalence, for it can be generated from two different types of 
dialogues sequences. (1) First, the counterconsideration could 
have been focused on the main thesis (See dialogue 1, below). 
(2) Second, the counterconsideration could have been focused 
on the connection between the first (or second) positive reason, 
“the picture is deal for children” and the thesis, so that the 
second (or first) positive reason, “it will be gone by tomorrow,” 
functions to support the proponent’s denial that the 
counterconsideration shows the connection between the first (or: 
second) reason and the thesis to be false (See dialogue 2, 
below).  
 
Proponent: You ought to take your son to the movies (T). 
Opponent: Why? For all you've shown, my lawn needs cutting! 
(C) 
Proponent: Okay. But though your lawn might need cutting, you 
ought to go. (¬(C⇒¬T) ) 
Opponent: Why? 
Proponent Because the picture is ideal for children. (S) 
Opponent: How would that support that I ought to go even if my 
lawn needs cutting? (Why S⇒(¬(C⇒¬T))?) 
Proponent: It will be gone by tomorrow. (V) 
Dialogue 1.  
 
The argument diagram that captures this reading of the 
conductive argument is (where “&” indicates single or 
complementary argumentation): 
 
         V 
 
 
S⇒(¬(C⇒¬T))   &   S 
 
  
¬(C⇒¬T)   
 
    
              T 
 
Figure 10. Diagram for dialogue 1 
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Proponent: You ought to take your son to the movies. (T) 
Opponent: Why?  
Proponent: Because the picture is ideal for children. (S) 
Opponent: Why would I take my son there, if the picture is ideal 
for children? My lawn might need cutting, for all you’ve shown. 
(Why S⇒T? How about C?) 
Proponent: You need to take your son to the movies, if the 
picture is ideal for children, even though your lawn might need 
cutting. (¬(C⇒¬(S⇒T)) 
Opponent: Why? 
Proponent: Because, it will be gone by tomorrow. (V) 
Dialogue 2.  
 
The argument diagram that captures this second reading of the 
conductive argument is: 
 
  V 
 
   
                         ¬(C⇒¬(S⇒T) 
 
 




               T 
 
Figure 11. Diagram for Dialogue 2 
 
Both readings of Wellmann’s example can be diagrammed more 
tersely by leaving out some details, which shows that these two 
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S &  V 
 
 
    




However, if one aims to show how the counterconsideration 
functions in the proponent's argument in some detail, I propose 
to include in the diagram the proposition that the 
counterconsideration does not show the thesis or connection 
premise to be false (“¬(C⇒¬T)” or “¬(C⇒¬(S⇒T))”). 
 4. There seems to be no good reason for assigning 
special importance in a theory of argumentation to a complex 
argument in which the proponent acknowledges the 
counterconsideration to be acceptable as well as negatively 
relevant to his thesis, yet not sufficient to defeat the argument. 
The other full responses seem to merit equal treatment (Van 
Laar, 2013). 
 5. Govier writes that: "In acknowledging 
counterconsiderations while at the same time putting forward 
supporting premises and asserting the conclusion to be 
supported by good reasons, an arguer is committing himself or 
herself to the claim that the supporting considerations 
"outweigh" the counter-considerations and render the 
conclusion acceptable" (Govier, 2011, p. 266). Similarly, others 
hold that a conductive argument contains a separate, though 
implicit, “on balance premise” (Hansen, 2011, pp. 38-39) or “on 
balance principle” (Zenker, 2011, p. 75) that expresses the 
arguer’s commitment to the pros outweighing the cons. I would 
propose to identify the following proposition, part of the 
proponent’s argument, as fulfilling the job of such on balance 
commitments, yet at the cost of losing the weighing metaphor, 
and its suggestion of a continuum of strengths: "It is not the case 
that if your counterconsideration C is true (acceptable), my 
thesis T (or connection premise) is false (indefensible)." For 
example, to return to our leading example of Section 4: “It is not 
the case that this book is not a good buy, if this book is quite 
expensive” or in Wellman’s example: “It’s not the case that you 
do not need to take your son to the movies, if your lawn needs 
cutting” (see premise “¬(C⇒¬T)” in Figure 9, and Figure 10, 
and premise “¬(C⇒¬(S⇒T))” in Figure 11). Such a special 
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premise can lead the proponent, if challenged, to support this 
denial, thereby expanding on his case.  
It may not be bad to abstain from relying heavily on the 
weighing metaphor when characterizing conduction. Although 
its connotation of automaticity and fake precision can be 
eliminated by conceiving of weighing as hefting in one’s hand 
(Fischer, 2011, p. 86), the metaphor appeals to an act, the act of 
weighing, that is clearly non-discursive, and that wrongly 
suggests that this kind of "on balance" commitment within the 
proponent’s argumentation is a matter of perception or personal 
experience, and thereby less fit for further discussion. However, 
there is no need to conceive of such assessments by the 
proponent as being the last word on the issue. In a good 
argumentative exchange, also subtle argumentative connections, 
or the lack thereof, can be a proper topic for debate. What is 
more, in a dialectical theory, we should encourage the opponent 
to critically test the proponent’s claim that her 
counterconsideration does not show his thesis (or connection 
premise) to be indefensible. In order to encourage this critical 
attitude, the proponent should be advised not to present his point 
of view as the result of a process of weighing, but rather to 
formulate the proposition that the opponent’s 
counterconsideration does not show his thesis (or connection 
premise) to be false or indefensible, so that it can scrutinized if 
necessary. Thus, we should not rely too strongly on the idea of 
“weighing” the pros and cons.  
6. Govier and Johnson hold that counterconsiderations 
differ from objections in being, by definition, negatively 
relevant to the thesis at issue, as well as being part of the 
argument’s illative core rather than of its dialectical tier. Govier 
writes, conceding a point of criticism by Johnson: “Counter-
considerations, as explained above, are claims negatively 
relevant to the acceptability of the conclusion. Here we are 
dealing with those counter-considerations that are acknowledged 
by the arguer. The arguer himself or herself is allowing these 
negatively relevant points, and indeed the counter-
considerations are part of his or her case. Objections to an 
argument, on the other hand, are not integral parts of that 
argument and are not part of the arguer’s case. If after being 
raised in a dialectical context, they come to be incorporated into 
an adapted version of an arguer’s case, they could at that point 
    Jan Albert van Laar    
	  
© Jan Albert van Laar, Informal Logic, Vol. 34, No. 3 (2014), pp. 240-275.	  
	  
272
play the role of counter-considerations. Thus the same point 
might be couched as an objection by someone other than the 
arguer and come to be acknowledged by the arguer as a counter-
consideration” (2011, p. 267). Yet, as we have seen, the so-
called illative core is in the current dialogical (if not “hyper-
dialectical”, see Finocchiaro, 2005, p. 321) conception itself 
reducible to dialogue. Moreover, counterconsiderations can be 
encapsulated and acknowledged in complex argument in ways 
different from the conductive way of doing so. Thus, seeing a 
counterconsideration as a move by a critical opponent 
constitutes a more general account than the account by Johnson 
and Govier, yet without losing insights offered by their 
accounts. Therefore, I surmise that it is better to conceive of 
counterconsiderations, and the ways to take them into account, 
from a dialogical perspective. 
7. Govier (2011, p. 269) explains why she is “rather 
resistant” to model, as Blair suggested (2011, p. 6), conduction 
as dialogue. For, then “something has been lost, namely the 
incorporation of both positively and negatively relevant factors 
into a single view. It is this element of balance, of fairness, of 
recognition that there are alternative views on behalf of which 
reasonable points can be made, that has for many been an 
especially important and intriguing aspect of pro and con 
conductive argument” (p. 269). As this paper has shown, 
nothing needs to be lost on a dialogical account, and dialogue 
may generate or underlie the arguments that take 
counterconsiderations into account. 
8. The kind of criticism taken into account in a 
conductive argument can be a counterargument. But, as I hope 
to have shown, it can also be the kind of counterconsideration 
that is merely cautiously asserted, so that the proponent cannot 
challenge the opponent to defend the counterconsideration’s 
acceptability, or its sufficiency to defeat. Instead, it is up to the 
proponent to refute such a counterconsideration, and that is what 
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